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years (R. 251-252). 
16. On December 12, 1994, Jacques filed with this court a supplemental brief. Because 
the focus of Jacques' arguments on appeal have been altered by the supplemental record, 
Jacques requests that the court view this supplemental brief as a replacement brief. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On August 8, 1992, Lawrence Groneman, a pharmacist at the Edgemont Pharmacy 
received a phone call from a person representing himself as Dr. Scott Hansen (Tr. 93, Lines 
22-25; Tr. 94, Lines 1-2). The person requested a prescription of Vicodin for a Ken Wilson, 
because he was not familiar with Dr. Hansen and Vicodin is a scheduled controlled 
substance, R. Groneman became suspicious (Tr. 94, Lines 3-21). He contacted Dr. Hansen 
who told him that he had not called in the prescription (Tr. 95, Lines 22-25). Mr. 
Groneman then called the police, as he believed a fraudulent prescription had been made (Tr. 
96, Lines 11-17). 
A short time later, a black male, later identified as Jacques, entered the pharmacy 
(Tr. 97, Lines 10-14). Earlier that day, Ken Wilson asked Jacques to check if the 
prescription had come in, since Jacques would be driving that way (Tr. 224, Lines 2-25, Tr. 
225, Lines 1-16). At the pharmacy, Jacques simply asked Mr. Groneman if a prescription 
for Ken Wilson had been called in and did not say that he was Ken Wilson (Tr. 97, Lines 
16-20). Mr. Groneman told Jacques that he needed a few minutes to verify the order (Tr. 
98, Lines 5-7). At that time, Jacques left the pharmacy to get something to eat (Tr. 226, 
Lines 7-8). At no time did Mr. Groneman fill the prescription for Ken Wilson and give it to 
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Mr. Jacques (Tr. 96, Lines 20-23). Jacques did not obtain any type of prescription from the 
pharmacy (Tr. 97, Lines 8-9). 
When Jacques left the pharmacy, Mr. Groneman followed him, getting the license 
plate number of the vehicle and its description (Tr. 100, Lines 13-25; Tr. 101, Lines 1-3). 
Returning to the pharmacy, Mr. Groneman described what had transpired to police officer 
Ferguson (Tr. 102, Lines 10-22). After he finished eating, Jacques left to go back home 
(Tr. 227, Lines 17-22). At this time, Mr. Groneman noticed Jacques car, which he pointed 
out to officer Ferguson (Tr. 102, Lines 21-25; Tr. 103, Lines 1-13). Officer Ferguson 
called in the description of the car and driver (Tr. 103, Lines 13-15). 
A few minutes later, Officer Feguson received a call on his radio that a car matching 
his description had been stopped by Officer Hale (Tr. 170, Lines 14-24). Arriving at the 
scene, officer Ferguson found Jacques already outside his car (Tr. 171, Lines 2-5). He 
detained Jacques until Mr. Groneman and Jody Kirk arrived (Tr. 172, Lines 19-25). They 
identified Jacques as the person who had earlier entered the pharmacy (Tr. 173, Lines 4-13). 
Jacques was then placed under arrest. He was charged with attempting to violate Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) and § 58-37-8(5). A jury trial was held on March 22, 1993, 
before Judge Guy R. Burningham, Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, in which Jacques 
was found guilty of violating the above sections. On April 21, 1993, Jacques was sentenced 
under the commission of a Second Degree Felony to one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. On November 8, 1994, based upon an incorrect and illegal charge, Jacques' 
conviction was reduced to a Third Degree Felony and his sentence was reduced to zero to 
five years. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(7) (1992 as Amended) 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On August 11, 1992, the Defendant, Marvin J. Jacques, was charged with Attempted 
Fraudulent Obtaining of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) and § 58-37-8(5) (1953 as 
Amended) (R. 1). 
2. Defendant made a motion for a photo line-up on September 22, 1992. The motion 
was granted the same day (R. 10-12). 
3. Arraignment was held on October 23, 1992, and Jacques entered a plea of not guilty. 
Ms. Linda Anderson also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The Motion was granted 
and John Musselman of the old public defender's office was appointed to represent Jacques 
(R. 28-29). 
4. Jacques filed a motion to dismiss for unfair identification and error in the charge on 
January 14, 1993 (R. 58). 
5. The Fourth Judicial District, Judge Guy R. Burningham denied Jacques' motion to 
dismiss in a proceeding on January 27, 1993. Trial set for March 22, 1993 (R. 80). 
6. Jacques then filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence on February 1, 1993 (R. 84-91). 
7. Jacques filed voir dire questions on February 18, 1993 (R. 111-13). 
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8. Jacques filed a Motion in Limine to prevent the State from using evidence of past 
criminal conviction on March 23, 1993 (R. 135-140). 
9. On March 22-23, 1993 a jury trial was held where Jacques was found guilty of 
Attempted Fraudulent Obtaining of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) and § 58-37-8(5) 
(1953 as Amended) (R. 168-173). 
10. Judgment and sentence were entered on April 21, 1993. The court ordered the 
Defendant to be confined to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen years with the 
sentence to run concurrent with any other sentence (R. 192-93). 
11. The Notice of Appeal filed with the trial court on May 21, 1993 (R. 199-200). 
12. On June 3, 1994, Jacques, through his current counsel, Danny Frazier of the Utah 
County Public Defender Association filed an Appellant Brief with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
13. Also on June 3, 1994, Jacques filed a motion for correction of sentence and re-
sentence nun pro tunc with the Fourth District Court (R. 243). 
14. On July 13, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court 
for proceedings on Jacques' motion for resentencing, stayed the appellate proceedings 
pending resolution of that issue and the preparation of a supplemental record, and granted 
Jacques leave to file a supplemental brief. 
15. On November 8, 1994, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham of the Fourth District 
Court found that Jacques had been incorrectly charged and convicted of a second degree 
felony and ordered that Jacques conviction be reduced to a third degree felony, which is 
punishable by a term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison rather than one to fifteen 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930344-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Because the supplemental record has dramatically changed the focus of Jacques' 
argument, he requests that this supplemental brief replace the Appellant's brief filed on June 
3, 1994. 
1. Did the trial court commit plain error in its failure to recognize prior to or during 
trial that Jacques had been incorrectly charged with a second degree felony? This issue 
should properly be reviewed for a determination of whether "the error was both plain and 
harmful." State v. Cook, 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. Was Jacques denied effective assistance of counsel because of trial counsel's failure to 
recognize that Jacques was improperly charged and subsequently illegally convicted? "Where 
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the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can only determine 
that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as a matter of 
law...If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but prejudice cannot be determined on the 
record before us, remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993); State v. EUifritz. 835 P.2d 
170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4) (a) (ii) (1992 as Amended) 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: (ii) to 
acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from 
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(5) (1992 as Amended) 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section...is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
According to the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii), § 58-37-
8(5) and § 58-37-8(7) Jacques should have been charged with a Third Degree Felony. The 
trial court committed reversible plain error in failing to recognize the incorrectness of the 
charge. The fact that Jacques' conviction was later reduced to a Third Degree Felony and he 
was resentenced accordingly does not adequately redress the harm suffered by Jacques by the 
faulty charge. In addition, trial counsel's failure to correct the mistaken charge in the 
information denied Jacques his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Based upon the foregoing reasons, this court should vacate Jacques' conviction and 
remand the case for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ITS FAILURE 
TO RECOGNIZE PRIOR TO OR DURING TRIAL THAT JACQUES HAD BEEN 
INCORRECTLY CHARGED WITH A SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme Court set forth 
the requirements for plain error: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain 
appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the 
appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable liklihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
(citations ommitted). If, however, "any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is 
not established." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 (citations ommitted). 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN OBVIOUS ERROR IN ITS FAILURE 
TO RECOGNIZE THAT JACQUES WAS IMPROPERLY CHARGED 
Marvin Jean Jacques was charged in the information with ATTEMPTED 
FRAUDULENT OBTAINING OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG ZONE, a 
Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) and 
§ 58-37-8(5) (R. 1). After a jury trial, Jacques was sentenced for committing a Second 
Degree Felony offense (R. 198). Both the charge and penalty against Jacques are in error. 
It is obvious from the plain language of the applicable statutes that maximum charge and 
penalty Jacques could be convicted of under the statute is a Third Degree Felony. 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(b) states that "any person convicted of violating 
subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony." Jacques was not convicted of violating 
subsection (4)(a)(ii), but attempting to violate subsection (4)(a)(ii) as prescribed by subsection 
(7). Under subsection (7), a person charged and convicted of an attempt to commit an 
activity prohibited by Utah Code Annoted § 58-37-8 is guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. An attempt to violate subsection (4)(a)(ii) 
would, therefore, reduce the Third Degree Felony to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Jacques was also charged and convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37-8(5). This provision modifies the penalty for attempting to acquire or obtain a 
controlled substance in a Drug Free Zone. It enhances the maximum charge given for a 
particular offense under § 58-37-8(4) one degree if the activity occurs within 1,000 feet of an 
elementary or secondary school. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(i), (5)(a)(ix), and (5)(c). 
The pharmacy which Defendant attempted to obtain a controlled substance from was found to 
be within 1,000 feet of a high school (R. 1). Subsection (5) of § 58-37-8 would thus 
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enhance Jacques' Class A Misdemeanor charge up one degree to a Third Degree Felony. 
The trial court, therefore, committed obvious error in its failure to recognize that according 
to the plain language of the applicable statutes, Jacques had been incorrectly charged with a 
Second Degree Felony. In fact, the trial court later, when faced with the mistake, reduced 
Jacques' conviction to a Third Degree Felony and corrected his sentence (R. 251-52). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IS HARMFUL TO JACQUES 
While the harm suffered by Jacques in regards to sentencing has been corrected, the 
harm he suffered at trial as a result of the trial court's error has not been rectified. 
Confidence in Jacques' Second Degree Felony conviction is seriously undermined by the trial 
court's error. See, Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. The trial itself was tainted by the prejudice of 
the incorrect charge. Jacques was clearly harmed at trial by the stigma of being charged 
incorrectly with a Second Degree Felony. The more serious the crime, the more distant the 
Defendant becomes from the jury. The degree of offense may further impact upon the 
weight the jury chooses to give to various proffers of evidence; or at the very least, it will 
affect the jury's attitudes towards the Defendant and undermine his or her credibility. 
Therefore, because the trial court committed error that is both obvious and harmful, 
this court should reverse and remand Jacques' conviction. 
POINT II 
JACQUES WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised concurrently with an 
allegation of plain error because if the error was plain to the court, it should also have been 
plain to trial counsel. See, Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09, 1225-29 (Utah 1993); State v. 
9 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990); and State 
v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 826 (Utah App. 1994). 
As a result, this court should conclude as a matter of law that, based upon the record, 
Jacques was denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's failure to 
recognize, appreciate, or adequately object to the incorrect charge. State v. Snyder. 860 
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993) ("Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on 
direct appeal, this court can only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance 
of counsel if it can do so as a matter of law."). 
In determining whether Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel "this 
court cannot apply rigid mechanical rules, but instead must focus 'on the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" Strickland v. Washington. 466 
U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State v. Snyder. 860 p.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 
1993). 
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show: (1) 
that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that 
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. 
Hunt. 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 
App. 1989); State v. Geary. 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). As the Strickland two-prong 
test is being utilized, it should be remembered that the right to effective counsel is a crucial 
element of a criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the focus of the review 
should be "on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged." 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. at 2056; State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
A, TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED A DEMONSTRABLY DEFICIENT 
PERFORMANCE 
To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Defendant must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness, but the court is not to 
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson, 850 p.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993); Crestam, 707 P.2d 
at 1089. 
The fact that Jacques' trial counsel failed to correct the charge against Marvin 
Jacques, as stated in the information, is an instance of how counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel, on January 11, 1993, moved the 
court to change the charge to a Third Degree Felony because that is the penalty prescribed 
for subsection (4)(a)(ii) by Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(b) (R. 55). However, counsel 
failed to address Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(7) which mandates that persons convicted 
of attempt are guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty proscribed for that 
offense, which in this case would be a Class A Misdemeanor. Counsel's conduct raises 
doubt as to whether or not he actually read the statute. Moreover, when drafting the 
Defendant's proposed jury instructions, counsel had another opportunity to discover the 
mistake in the information. Nevertheless, Counsel, in Defendant's proposed jury 
instructions, submitted an instruction which characterized the above mentioned crime as a 
Second Degree Felony. In addition, trial counsel's failure to object to the incorrect charge 
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cannot be viewed as a choice of strategy because there is no legitimate reason for subjecting 
a criminal defendant to a more serious charge. 
B. BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ERROR THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WOULD 
PROBABLY HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability has been described as "a 
probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See Strickland. 466 U.S. 
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466; Crestam, 771 P.2d at 1089. 
In State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: "...there can be no appropriate performance in the courtroom without adequate 
preparation, and without such preparation, representation is nothing but a sham and a 
pretense." Trial counsel's blatant failure to recognize the incorrectness of the charge, which 
a reading of the statute would have clearly demonstrated, is indicative of counsel's lack of 
adequate preparation. Moreover, Jacques was offered a plea bargain from the prosecution in 
exchange for a guilty plea. The charges would have been dropped from a Second to a Third 
Degree Felony. If Jacques had been charged properly, it is likely that a similar plea bargain 
would have dropped the charge from a Third Degree Felony to a Class A Misdemeanor. If 
this is the case, it is unlikely that this matter would ever have made it to trial. Crestani has 
taught us that pretrial preparation is just as important as counsel's conduct in the courtroom 
in determining an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 1092. It is at this plea 
bargaining stage, before the matter even gets to the courtroom, that effective assistance of 
counsel is needed; especially in this particular instance. 
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In Parsons v. Barnes, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of a defendant's challenge of a guilty plea on grounds of ineffectiveness 
of counsel. The Utah court stated: 
Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he or she must show "a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In 
other words, counsels deficient performance must have "affected the outcome 
of the plea process." Id. 
Parsons, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (emphasis added). This principle should similarly apply 
to Jacques because although his situation is the flip-side of that in Parsons, counsel's 
deficient performance in failing to recognize the incorrectness of the charge "affected the 
outcome of the plea process." 
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 
be relied on as having produced a just result." Crestani at 1092. In this particular case the 
adversarial process cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. The potential for 
prejudice is too great. The more serious the crime, the more distant the Defendant becomes 
from the jury. The attitudes of the jury will be different depending on the charge the 
Defendant is facing. Granted, we are to assume that the jury is not to be affected by these 
sorts of things; but, at best, this is a legal fiction. 
Taking the effect of the mistaken charge in the information as a whole, there is a 
reasonable probability that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been 
different. The case most likely would never have been tried. The trial itself was tainted by 
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the prejudice of the mistaken charge. Therefore, Jacques' conviction should be reversed and 
he should be afforded a new trial. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
According to the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii), § 58-37-
8(5) and § 58-37-8(7) Jacques should have been charged with a Third Degree Felony. The 
trial court committed reversible plain error in failing to recognize the incorrectness of the 
charge. In addition, trial counsel's failure to correct the mistaken charge in the information 
denied Jacques his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel. Based 
upon the foregoing reasons, this court should vacate Jacques' conviction and remand the case 
for a new trial. * 
DATED this * C*dav of December, 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief Of Appellant this (/- day of Jtme, 1994, to the following. 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
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IN TEE FOURTS CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
V8, 
Plaintiff, 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES 
450 North 999 East #7 
Provo, Utah 
DOBi 9-19-63 
Defendant(s) 
INFORMATION 
Case No. £S£/^ / y ^ /rs 
Kay Bryson, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the 
defendant(s) of the following crime(s): 
ATTEMPTED FRAUDULENT OBTAINING OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A 
DRUG ZONE, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of 58-37-
8(4)(a)(ii) and 58-37-8-(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that he, on or about August 8, 1992, in Utah County, 
Utah, did attempt to acquire or obtain possession of any 
controlled substsuice by misrepresentation or fraud or by the use 
of a false name or address within a drug free zone. 
Information is based on evidence sworn to by: Richard Ferguson, 
Provo PD 
Defendant(s) appears by: Summons ( ) Warrant ( ) In-Custody (x) 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
8-8-92 
Tab 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah against 
the defendant in which he is accused by Information of the commission 
of the crimes of: 
ATTEMPTED FRAUDULENT OBTAINING OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN 
A DRUG FREE ZONE, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of 
58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) and 58-37-8(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, in that defendant, on or about August 8, 1992, 
in Utah County, Utah, did attempt to acquire or obtain 
possession of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or fraud or by the use of a false name or address within a 
drug free zone. 
When the defendant was arraigned on the charges, he entered a 
plea of not guilty, which casts upon the state the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the charges which 
are set forth in Instruction No. 
The foregoing instruction is not to be regarded as a statement o 
the facts proved in this case, but is to be considered merely as a 
summarized statement of the accusation against the defendant. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT 
(JURY VERDICT) 
CASE NO. 921400493 
DATE: April 21,1993 
JUDGE: CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN 
SENIOR JUDGE 
REPT. BY: Vonda Bassett, CSR 
CLERK: ZBD 
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of judgment and sentence. 
Deputy County Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. Tbe 
defendant was present. Appearing for the defendant was John Musselman. 
The Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and being fully 
advised in tbe premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence and 
Commitment* 
JUDGMENT 
On die 23rd day of March, 1993, the defendant having been fffl*rcl gVTilTY b v a iurv 
of the offense of Attempted Fraudulent Obtaining of Controlled Substance in a Drug 
Free Zone, a 2nd Degree Felony, as charged in the Information; the Court finding no legal 
reason why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
shown or appearing to the Court, it is ordered and adjudged that the defendant is guilty as 
charged and convicted. 
Mr. Musselman addressed the Court in defendant's behalf. Def is presently in 
prison on a probation violation in another matter. Counsel requested def be given credit for 
«i 
time served in this case prior to going to trial. 
The defendant addressed the Court in his own behalf. At this time Mr. Jacques 
requested another attorney be appointed to help him with die appeal. Matter discussed. 
The Court requested the Public Defenders office furnish the Court with names of 
the attorneys contracted by their office. The Court also admonished die defendant that this is 
a Court appointed attorney and def cannot change attorneys whenever he wishes. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant to 
be confined in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate torn of not less than one (1) nor 
more than fifteen (15) years. This sentence to run concurrent with any other sentence to 
which def may now be subject and it is recommended that any time served in jail pending 
these proceedings be credited to defendant. 
COMMITMENT 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the authorities, to be transported to the 
Warden of the Utah State Prison in execution of this judgment and sentence. 
Dated this 21 day of April, 1993. "~ 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Adult Probation and Parole 
Utah State Prison 
Tab 4 
^AHCOUHTY 
D. JOHM MDSSELMA* (5582) fort 
ZABRISKX2 6 MUSSELMA* 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Jamestown Square 
Hannover Building, Suite 370 
3507 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7680 
Facsimile: (801) 375-7686 
IK THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUMTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo—~ 
STATB OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES, 
Defendant. 
Mo. 921400493 
—-oooOooo—— 
COMES MOW the Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, D. 
JOHN MUSSELMAN, and respectfully submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in_sggport of frls-Motion to DisnissT^ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 8, 1992 a blade male veering a blue winter cap entered 
the Edgemont Pharmacy an<t^attempt^ to obtain possession of a 
prescription drug. The pharmacist, suspecting an attempt to obtain 
possession of the drug through fraud, notified police. Meanwhile, the 
man had left the pharmacy* Officers arrested the Defendant and 
summoned the pharmacist to the scene of the arrest. The Defendant, in 
handcuffs and in custody of the police, was displayed to the 
pharmacist who identified the Defendant as the same man who had 
entered the pharmacy and had attempted to gain possession of the 
prescription drug. The pharmacist was later asked to pick the 
perpetrator out of a "photo lineup* which contained six photographs of 
adult men, one of whom was of the Defendant« The pharmacist 
identified the photograph of the Defendant* The Defendant was charged 
with "Attempted Fraudulent Obtaining Of A Controlled Substance In A 
Drug Zone" (sic) a Second Degree Felony. 
POXBT I 
THB IDSKTIFICATICM FSOCBDQRB WAS FLAMED AND T3&BO&BL 
The law is well established in Utah that in any identification or 
line up procedure, care must be taken to prevent any influence upon 
the citizen who is asked to make an identification which may be unduly 
persuasive as to that identification* In this case, the display of 
the Defendant in custody and in handcuffs to the pharmacist was most 
persuasive to the conclusion that: the man in custody was the man who 
had been into the pharmacy earlier that evening* The Defendant also 
contends that the photo lineup procedure was unduly slanted toward an 
identification of this Defendant singling him out from the other 
photograph* meed in the lineup. 
2h* case of State v, grvii^ f 22 Utah 2nd 216, 451 P.2d 372 (1969) 
stands for the proposition that a lineup procedure should be handled 
with caution so a not to place blame cm innocent people* In that case 
the Utah Supreme Court also held that when such a question arises, the 
2 
resolution of that issue rests largely within the discretion of the 
trial court and that an inquiry into the relevant facts should be made 
in order to rule thereon. 
One earlier Utah case has dealt with a similar issue. In the 
case of Stfltf v- Jordan. 26 Utah 2d 240, 487 P.2d 1281 (1971) the 
Defendant was viewed by a witness in the hall of the courthouse prior 
to a preliminary hearing. The Defendant was in custody, in handcuffs 
and wearing a Salt Lake County Jail T-shirt. At the hearing, the 
Defendant was identified by the witness as one of the perpetrators. 
The court held in that case that no "substantial prejudice" resulted 
from the facts and refused to suppress the identification. However, 
it is important to note that in that case, the witness had made a 
prior identification during a line up of another of the co-defendants 
which fact was persuasive to the Utah Supreme Court. Also the view in 
the hall was incidental according to the court and did not unduly 
influence the witness in his identification. 
In this case, the display of the Defendant in custody and in 
handcuffs just a short time after the alleged offense was entirely 
persuasive to the witness and once^identifiedfNany subsequent line up 
procedure or identification was taint$d--entl should be suppressed. 
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POINT II 
THE CHARGE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTE 
The Defendant contends that the charge described in the Complaint 
is a Third Degree Felony, not a Second Degree Felony. The State has 
charged under §58-37-8 (4)(a)(ii) and § 58-37-8 (5). ^ The statute 
prescribes the same penalty for obtaining or attempting to obtain any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or fraud. In either case, 
it is a Third Degree FelonyT) The penalty is enhanced one degree if 
the offense occurs within 1,000 feet of certain structures, facilities 
or grounds. The Complaint is insufficient to charge a violation of 
the enhancement statute therefore the crime charged is a Third Degree 
Felony. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, due to the tainted method of identification, such 
identification should be suppressed. Since that is the entire case 
against the Defendant, the case should be dismissed. In any event, 
the charge should be designated as that for a Third Degree Felony. 
DATED this MIL day of January, 1993. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
iffi^k^rf. /^lu d M A M i i 
bT jfcHN KUSSELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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M A X I J X N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Meiioranduin of Points and Authorities, postage prepaid, to 
Carlyle Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this 
I/* day of January, 1993. 
D.SJQWt HUSSELHAN 
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• ' iv^ 
C. DANNY FRAZIER (5698) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
40 West 100 South, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN J. JACQUES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
: Case No. 921400493 
: Judge Guy R. Burningham 
Defendant's Motion for Resentencing Nunc Pro Tunc was heard in the Fourth District Court 
19 October, 1994, Judge Guy R. Burningham presiding. Defendant, Marvin Jean Jacques was 
present with counsel C. Danny Frazier, Utah County Public Defender Association. Assistant Utah 
County Attorney Sherry Ragan was present in behalf of the State. 
The Court heard the arguments of counsel, and upon consideration of these and the 
accompanying written memoranda, issues the following Findings and Order: 
FINDINGS 
1. That on or about 21 April, 1993, Defendant Marvin Jean Jacques was sentenced to 
serve an indeterminate period of 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison for the second degree felony 
crime of Attempt to Acquire a Controlled Substance by Fraud or Misrepresentation. Said sentence 
was in accordance with the charge and verdict of the jury. 
2. That the crime of which Mr, Jacques was charged, convicted and sentenced was 
incorrectly and illegally pursued as a second degree felony with a possible penalty of 1 to 15 years 
and/or a maximum $10,000.00 fine and should rightly have been considered a third degree felony 
with a possible penalty of up to 5 years maximum at the Utah State Prison and/or a maximum 
possible $5,000.00 fine. 
3. That Defendant's Motion for Resentencing Nunc Pro Tunc is hereby granted and the 
offense reduced from a second to a third degree felony. Defendant is further resentenced and 
recommitted to the Department of Corrections in accordance herewith. 
ORDER 
1. The offense of which Defendant was charged, convicted and sentenced, Attempt to 
Acquire a Controlled Substance by Fraud or Misrepresentation, is hereby ordered reduced and 
hereinafter listed as a third degree felony on all documents and in all proceedings hereto relevant. 
2, Defendant is hereby resentenced in accordance herewith and ordered to be 
recommitted to the Department of Corrections pursuant to statute on the basis of his conviction, 
which shall now be considered as a third degree felony. 
DATED this . day of. ^Tln^^^--, 1994. 
BY THE CGORT: 
)RABIJE LYNfi W. DAVIS 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Sherry Ragan 
Assistant Utah County Attorney 
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